/v2/customer/* customer API are enabled. Username/password registration, independent applications and product permissions, email recovery and private downloads passed controlled live HTTPS acceptance. Customer SDK 1.0.0-rc.1 x64/x86 packages are available through authenticated Developer Downloads. The existing Windows loader is unchanged and is not yet integrated. Windows 10 execution and native ARM64 validation remain outstanding; binaries are unsigned. Do not treat this release candidate as certification of every Windows configuration.Separate public client material from privileged control.
Your Windows application receives the identifiers and public verification material required to authenticate. Organisation credentials, database access and management authority stay off the client.
Existing v1 client: use the matching SDK.
The SDK owns the signing, proof and response-validation behavior expected by the server. A normal client path begins with initialization and ends with server-authoritative validation.
Client API routes include initialization, licence activation, device-session creation, session validation and logout. Production requests must use HTTPS.
Session state remains backend-authoritative.
LoaderAuth does not treat a permanent copied token or local boolean as proof of current access. Sessions are short lived and remain subject to server-side licence, device and account state.
- Device proof binds sensitive requests to the enrolled device credential.
- Replay controls prevent a captured request proof being reused against another request.
- Revocation is checked server-side instead of waiting for a client-side expiry timer.
Verify package metadata before replacing local files.
Protected delivery uses private storage, short-lived grants and integrity metadata. The client should verify the exact expected size and SHA-256 digest before a downloaded file becomes active.
Management automation belongs on trusted infrastructure.
The live management API is for private server-to-server automation, not the loader. Keys are scoped to an organisation (not one application), can expire, can restrict source IPs and can be revoked. The simplified setup form defaults to read-only permissions and 30-day expiry; the existing dashboard has additional expiry choices.
Send X-Management-Key (UUID), X-Management-Request-Id (fresh UUID), X-Management-Timestamp (Unix seconds) and X-Management-Signature. The signature is base64url without padding of HMAC-SHA256 over newline-joined method, exact path, request UUID, timestamp and lowercase SHA-256 of the exact JSON body, using the secret string as the HMAC key. Verify signed response envelopes as well.
Create licences with application_id, duration_days, quantity and activation_mode. For customer product keys, add product_id and use one_time for a product redemption key. Omitting product_id retains legacy licensing. Do not use the legacy licence-device reset action to reset a customer account's devices.
Non-negotiable implementation rules.
- Require HTTPS for all production traffic.
- Use the supplied SDK instead of weakening protocol checks for convenience.
- Keep privileged credentials and database access server-side.
- Treat LoaderAuth backend state as authoritative for licences and sessions.
- Verify signed/integrity metadata before trusting protected downloads.
- Validate the complete integration in staging before commercial release.
One customer account, separate product subscriptions.
Dashboard navigation: all owner workspace sections share the same sidebar. Use Users for registered customer accounts and email verification, Licence keys for key status and expiry, Products for independent product permissions, and Private downloads for product releases. SDK downloads are separate from customer product files. Platform organisations manages dashboard owners, not loader customers.
Passwords and device binding: the panel shows that a password is hashed; neither the original password nor its hash is revealed. Use the verified-email password reset flow. Customer device limits bind the application-scoped fingerprint to a device signing key. Resetting devices revokes their sessions and requires enrollment again; it is not an unbreakable hardware lock.
IP activity: owner/admin roles can view full IPv4/IPv6 addresses observed during successful customer authentication and authenticated activity, with first/last-seen times. Addresses are encrypted at rest and scoped to the organisation and customer device. The panel shows up to 10 recent address/device pairs per account, retaining entries for 30 days after their last observation; device deletion/reset also removes associated history. Older hashed logs cannot reconstruct past IPs. An IP change does not automatically block the account, and a shared or changing IP alone does not establish account sharing.
Multiple loaders: use a separate application UUID and SDK instance for each independent loader. The same username may exist in different applications, but accounts, device credentials and subscriptions are isolated; this is not shared cross-application login. A single application can contain several independently licensed products.
Customer SDK 1.0.0-rc.1: C++ static library and C ABI DLL target Windows 10/11 (x86, x64 and native ARM64 builds). x64 DLL and x86 static-library clients passed real HTTPS tests on Windows 11. Windows 10 and native ARM64 execution remain acceptance gates; ARM64 is not published as a supported live package. Require signed response app_id to match your configured application and check the exact product, never a greater-than-or-equal level comparison. The SDK packages are separate from legacy v1 packages.
Use Users & products to create separate applications/product levels and issue product keys. Copy the public API URL, application UUID and canonical Base64 Ed25519 verification key from that page. client_version is your loader application version (for example 1.0.0), not the SDK package version; it must satisfy the application minimum version. Keep scoped management API secrets on trusted servers, never inside a loader.
Create an application, then add named products with numeric levels. Generate a key for the exact product. The first key registers a customer; additional keys redeem additional subscriptions on that account. A level is an identifier, not a hierarchy: level 3 never grants levels 1 or 2.
Public loader settings are the API base URL, application UUID and Ed25519 response verification public key. A customer licence code is a one-use secret. A management API credential is a different, privileged server-only secret.
All requests contain app_id, a fresh UUID request_id, integer Unix client_time and client_version. Registration also requires username, email, password, license_key, device_hash and base64 client_public_key. Login uses username/password and the same device identity. Usernames are 3–32 ASCII letters/digits or _.-, normalized to lowercase; passwords are 12–128 bytes.
Authenticated calls send Authorization: Bearer <session_token>. Sign each request with the enrolled device Ed25519 key. Never share a private device key across installations.
Verify X-Auth-Signature against the exact JSON response bytes using the pinned server public key. Check the signed envelope's request UUID, status and freshness. Reject unsigned, stale or mismatched responses. TLS remains mandatory: signatures do not encrypt passwords.
redeem takes license_key; authorize takes the exact product_id. Use authorized, not owned, for current access. Each product expires independently. Timed renewals extend remaining time for the same product. Session validation rotates the token with a short previous-token grace window; serialize validation requests and store the replacement securely. Customer accounts default to one device.
Private product downloads, not public file links.
In Products & customers, upload a ZIP, EXE, DLL or MSI draft for a product/version/architecture, then publish it. Upload and publish/revoke require release permissions, CSRF and MFA verified within 15 minutes. A package signature/type check is not a malware scan or a guarantee of trusted publisher identity.
Both calls require the normal authenticated device proof. Downloads also require verified customer email. The signed manifest includes release UUID, version, architecture, filename, exact byte count, SHA-256, download path and grant expiry. The default grant lifetime is 60 seconds (configurable between 15 and 300); grants are single-use, session-bound and IP-bound. Issuing a new manifest invalidates the session's previous unused grant.
The download rechecks the account, device/session, organisation billing, application, exact product entitlement and published release. The server verifies a private snapshot before returning bytes. The client must independently verify size and SHA-256 against the signed manifest before saving atomically or executing anything. Never trust a bare download header or filename as proof. Do not follow arbitrary download URLs.
A failed or interrupted transfer can require a new manifest. Revocation blocks subsequent requests; it cannot recall bytes already downloaded. Product files are stored separately from the legacy v1 release catalogue, so an unrelated v1 key cannot unlock them. The customer API is enabled; integration into your loader is a separate step.
Verify the mailbox before allowing recovery.
Request verification after registration, then enter the emailed code into the authenticated customer screen. Verification and reset tokens are purpose-bound, application-bound, one-use and valid for 30 minutes. Reset request responses are generic; only active accounts with previously verified email receive reset codes. The unauthenticated reset endpoints still require a fresh request UUID and a proof from the submitted ephemeral client key.
Recovery sends mail through a durable encrypted outbox. A successful reset does not log the user in: it revokes all device keys, sessions and download grants, queues a notification, and requires login with the new password and device enrollment. Unverified email is never proof of account ownership. There is no public customer browser portal; registration, login and recovery are SDK/API workflows to integrate into your loader.
Keep recovery and deployment independent from the loader.
Production currently has encrypted local backup jobs and local failure logging. An encrypted off-server copy has also been verified on the operator's PC. Daily off-server retrieval is scheduled in Codex on the operator’s PC; the PC and Codex must be running, and stale backups are reported. The operator has confirmed receiving the failure-alert email. Customer verification and password-reset emails were sent through the configured SMTP service and receipt was confirmed during live acceptance. Keep the recovery key protected separately from the encrypted archives.
Fresh installations default the customer feature off. This VPS has migrations 014, 015 and 016 applied and customer accounts enabled after backup, isolated staging tests and live SDK acceptance. A fresh backup was copied off-server and its database was restored into a disposable database before deployment. Do not reapply migration 015 blindly. Disable customer routes without removing the product-key guard in v1. Do not downgrade to code that treats product keys as legacy licences.
Release gates include regression/concurrency checks, actual mail delivery, off-server recovery and notification testing. The existing loader is unchanged; its end-to-end integration remains a separate required test before it is connected. No server or client can guarantee that downloaded code will never be copied or that a system is immune to attacks.